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M EAGHAN M URPHY ∗

Cities as the Original Sharing Platform1: Regulation
of the New “Sharing” Economy

Third-party platform providers in the “sharing economy,” such as Uber and
Airbnb, pose a unique quandary to policy makers in determining how to, or even
whether to, regulate their activities.2 Part I of this comment gives an overview of the
history of and what constitutes the sharing economy.3 Part I will also provide
background on Uber and Airbnb’s development, corporate model, and the
challenges they pose that require regulation.4 Part II of this comment examines the
current regulatory environment of the Uber and Airbnb analogues, the hotel and
taxi industry.5 In addition, Part II discusses how those regulations have been applied
to third party platform providers.6 Part III provides a brief overview of the proposed
methods of third-party platform regulation in the sharing economy.7 Finally, Part
IV posits that the most efficient method of managing the sharing economy is
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J.D. Candidate 2017, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law; B.A. in International
Relations, Washington College, 2011. I would like to thank the staff of the Journal of Business & Technology Law
for their thoughtful feedback and assistance in publishing this comment. I dedicate this comment to my
mother, Marcia, who has always supported and encouraged me to improve myself and achieve my dreams. I
also dedicate this comment to my family who gave me the push I needed to pursue a law degree and never
doubted that I would excel.
1.
Brian Chesky, Shared City, MEDIUM (Mar. 26, 2014), https://medium.com/@bchesky/shared-citydb9746750a3a (“Imagine if you could build a city that is shared. Where people become micro-entrepreneurs,
and local mom and pops flourish once again. Imagine a city that fosters community, where space isn’t wasted,
but shared with others. A city that produces more, but without more waste. While this may seem radical, it’s not
a new idea. Cities are the original sharing platforms.”).
2.
Infra Part I.
3.
Infra Part I.
4.
Infra Part I.
5.
Infra Part II.
6.
Infra Part II.
7.
Infra Part III.
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Cities as the Original Sharing Platform
through localized, responsive and quick acting regulations that reflect the sharing
economy’s amorphous nature, which is best done at the local and community level.8

I.

A.

THE SHARING ECONOMY: WHAT IS IT AND HOW DID IT COME TO
BE?

How Did the “Sharing Economy” Come to Be?

Activities collectively referred to as “the sharing economy” have been around long
before the advent of apps like Uber or Airbnb that serve as digital third-party
platforms to connect individuals with something to share and those who desire
those services. Throughout history, communities have pooled their resources
together in order to share amongst themselves and efficiently manage those
resources.9 Examples of this practice can be found in the Native Americans, the
Maasai in Kenya, and many villages in Europe that had “commons,” communal
farming, hunting and grazing areas.10 Commons continue to exist today in the form
of public parks, libraries, community resources, etc.11
The sharing economy was not limited to tangible goods or property. Many
professions that required specialized training and involved peer-to-peer
transactions had organizations that set regulations for the provision of their
services, such as their salaries, tools, and work quality.12 The public nature of these
specialized peer-to-peer transactions—doctors, lawyers, merchants, and other
crafts—mandated some organization, such as guilds in medieval Europe or
professional associations, to provide a framework that allowed the most efficient
use of specialist services.13
These sharing practices have begun to re-emerge thanks to the facility of
organizing peer-to-peer transactions with new technology.14 With emerging

8.

Infra Part IV.
Molly Cohen & Arun Sundararajan, Self-Regulation and Innovation in the Peer-to-Peer Sharing
Economy, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 116, 124–25 (2015); see also Sofia Ranchordas, Does Sharing Mean
Caring? Regulating Innovation in the Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 456 (2015) (“Sharing
practices are far from unique to the 21st century. Instead, they are primitive practices that were historically used
to bind and connect communities, but became diluted in our consumerist society, where we … for[got] the
benefits of sharing.”).
10.
Self-Regulation and Innovation, supra note 9, at 124–125.
11.
TOM SLEE, WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE: AGAINST THE SHARING ECONOMY 23 (2015).
12.
Self-Regulation and Innovation, supra note 9, at 125.
13.
Id.
14.
Does Sharing Mean Caring?, supra note 9, at 456 (“Online platforms are taking us back to the time
when we used to trust strangers and offer them shelter and food, trade goods with them to seal bonds of
9.
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research on the effect cars and other industrialized technology have on the
environment, the recent movement towards protecting the environment has also
served as an impetus to encourage individuals to share their excess resources.15
Finally, the weak economy forced many people to look for alternative sources of
income and consider the nature of their consumption.16 The goal of sharing
economy proponents is to build a more sustainable economy that focuses more on
community building and sharing between strangers.17 However, the reality has been
an attempt by a few powerful companies to extend de-regulation into previously
protected portions of our lives by spending “billions of dollars … challenging
democratically made laws around the world,” with an end result of the sharing
economy “reshaping cities without regard to those things that make them livable.”18
B.

What is the Modern “Sharing Economy”?

As should be clear from the various purposes listed above for the resurgence of the
sharing economy, the “sharing economy” can be a bit of a misnomer. The sharing
economy lacks a common definition due to the wide variety of goods, services, and
activities that can be included under the umbrella term.19 However common terms
which frequently fall under the auspices of the “sharing economy” include:
“‘collaborative consumption,’20 ‘peer economy,’ or ‘collaborative economy;’”21 the
“gig economy”22 or “access economy.”23 The key element to all of these involves
friendship, and share items in order to avoid acquiring goods that we do not need more than once or twice in a
lifetime.”).
15.
JANELLE ORSI, PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY: HELPING PEOPLE BUILD COOPERATIVES,
SOCIAL ENTERPRISE, AND LOCAL SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIES 4 (2012).
16.
Technology Quarterly, All Eyes on the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/news/technology-quarterly/21572914-collaborative-consumption-technologymakes-it-easier-people-rent-items.
17.
PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 15, at 4–6 (explaining the benefits of sharing
activities and organizations that allow for more community development and self-reliance in the face of an
uncertain economy).
18.
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 10, 12 (“[T]he Sharing Economy is extending a harsh and
deregulated free market into previously protected areas of our lives. The leading companies are now corporate
juggernauts themselves, and are taking a more and more intrusive role in the exchanges they support to make
their money and to maintain their brand.”). Id. at 10.
19.
Does Sharing Mean Caring?, supra note 9, at 457.
20.
Id. at 458 (“‘Collaborative consumption’ has been defined in the literature as ‘a form of consumption
where people share consumption of goods and services online.’”).
21.
Id. at 457.
22.
The Editorial Board, Defining ‘Employee’ in the Gig Economy, N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 18, 2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/19/opinion/sunday/defining-employee-in-the-gig-economy.html?_r=0. The
“gig economy” refers to online digital platforms that employ “independent contractors” to provide the services
the platform advertises. Id.
23.
PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 15, at 4–5. The “access economy” refers to the
ability to access things an individual needs without owning it. Id.
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Cities as the Original Sharing Platform
sharing a service or resource, with or without monetary compensation.24 Generally,
the sharing economy also promotes more efficient use of resources.25 For the
purposes of this article, the term “sharing economy” will be used to include all of
the above concepts since they each have an impact on the effective regulation of
sharing economy activities.
The range of activities included in the sharing economy exist in a gray area on a
spectrum between private acts and commercial activity.26 At the private end of the
scale lay activities not subject to regulation as the private acts of individuals.27 At the
commercial end of the scale lay activities subject to regulation, taxes, and other
laws.28 The dichotomy between these two types of activities is reflected in the given
name of the sharing economy. “Sharing” is generally an action motivated by
generosity with no thought of profit, whereas an “economy’s” primary function is
to increase and distribute profit.29
Janelle Orsi, an expert in the field of sharing economy transactions, recognizes
four “platforms” within the gray area of the spectrum encompassed by the sharing
economy.30 The first platform encompasses “casual, spontaneous, and one-time
transactions.”31 This includes activities such as lending a friend your car, sharing
extra tomatoes from your garden, or bringing a dish to a neighborhood block party.
These transactions lack a formal structure and are motivated out of a sense of
generosity and the relationship shared between participants.32 Obviously, this kind
of “transaction” would not be subject to government regulations.33
The second platform is slightly more formal, but still closer to the personal end
of the spectrum. “Building agreements” allow individuals with pre-existing
relationships to make slightly more formal arrangements.34 This may involve
agreeing to rotate childcare duties with neighbors or arranging a car pool with coworkers.35
The third platform in the gray area on the sharing economy spectrum is closer to
commercial activity. This platform involves “building organizations” to create
lasting sharing institutions in a community.36 This level of the sharing economy is
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
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Does Sharing Mean Caring?, supra note 9, at 457.
Id. at 416.
PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 15, at 262.
Id.
Id.
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 16.
PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 15, at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 262.
Id. at 11.
Id.
PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 15, at 11.
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more distant from the personal transactions of the earlier two levels, as it allows the
sharing arrangement to continue regardless of the continued participation of
individual members.37 An example of this type of organization is a neighborhood
food cooperative.38
Finally, the most formal platform of the sharing economy envisioned by Orsi is
“building larger-scale infrastructure” to create an ongoing sharing economy.39 This
level is also the closest to a commercial activity. This level builds “platforms,”
similar to those created by third-party platform providers like Uber and Airbnb,
integrated into the community, town or region with the “cooperation of multiple
stakeholders and leadership by [the] local government[].”40 An example of this level
of sharing economy is a community-wide bike-sharing program.41 The sharing
economy exists on a blurred line between the personal and the professional, which
makes it a challenge to regulate.
C.

Uber and Airbnb: The Titans of the Sharing Economy42

The challenge of sharing economy regulation is highlighted by the wide variety of
sharing services available. Individuals can share their homes, cars, parking places,
used clothing, tools, time, and capital via online platforms.43 Two platforms will be
used as examples throughout this article to highlight potential regulatory solutions:
Uber and Airbnb.
Uber is a ride-sharing service offered around the world.44 Uber hires local
“partner drivers,” as independent contractors who use the Uber digital platform
application to offer their driving services to consumers.45 Uber drivers set their own
hours, but they are subject to a background check and must buy the insurance Uber
offers.46 Uber sets the prices and charges the passenger electronically via an
algorithm that takes into account the destination and time of day, so that no cash

37.

Id.
Id.
39.
Id. at 12.
40.
Id.
41.
Id.
42.
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 12 (“For many people, these two companies are the Sharing
Economy, and they have given rise to a legion of imitators pitching venture capitalists with their efforts to be
‘the Uber of this’ or ‘the Airbnb of that.’”).
43.
Molly Cohen & Corey Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes New: Regulating the Sharing Economy, 58 BOS.
B.J. 34, 34 (2014) (“Citizens can share space in their homes (Airbnb), seats in their car (Lyft, Sidecar, UberX),
places to park (Park Circa), used clothing (ThredUp), outdoor gear (gearcommons), time in the day
(TaskRabbit, Instacart), and even capital (Zopa, Prosper).”).
44.
Find a City, UBER, https://www.uber.com/cities (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
45.
Uber Needs Partners Like You, UBER, https://get.uber.com/drive/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
46.
Uber Driver Requirements, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/requirements/ (last visited Oct. 25,
2016).
38.
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Cities as the Original Sharing Platform
changes hands.47 In exchange for this service, Uber takes a percentage of the
payment for itself.48 Uber drivers and passengers also have the ability to rate each
other, enabling drivers and passengers to make educated decisions about whether to
pick up a passenger or get in the car with a driver.49 When a driver’s or a passenger’s
rating gets too low, Uber kicks them off the service.50
Airbnb is a home-sharing service that functions similarly to Uber and has faced
many similar obstacles. Airbnb hosts may offer up their homes for strangers to stay
in.51 Airbnb takes a percentage of any booking fee and collects taxes where
applicable.52 The entire transaction is conducted online with no cash changing
hands.53 Airbnb differs from Uber in that its hosts set their own prices.54 Airbnb also
relies on host and guest ratings to determine who retains access to the service.55
The vast majority of Airbnb’s business takes place in cities that are major tourist
centers, which, unsurprisingly, is where the vast majority of their regulatory
disputes have also occurred.56 Like taxi drivers and Uber, Airbnb has encountered
problems with local regulations when hosts are found to be running illegal hotels.57
Cities with large amounts of Airbnb postings experience issues with affordable
housing shortages for permanent residents,58 destructive tourists,59 and higher crime
rates for activities like prostitution.60 New York in particular has been hard hit by
housing shortages for permanent residents.61 This resulted in a legal dispute
between the New York Attorney General, Eric Schneiderman, and Airbnb. The
Attorney General’s office believed many hosts were violating housing regulations

47.

Start Riding With Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/features (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 64.
49.
Safe Rides, Safer Cities, UBER, https://www.uber.com/safety (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
50.
Id.; see also WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 72.
51.
AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com /host (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
52.
Why Rent Your Space on Airbnb?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/host (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
Hospitality Standards, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/hospitality (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
56.
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 35 (“The highest-profile dispute has been in New York City,
but it has also run into problems in all its major markets, including Amsterdam, Los Angeles, Berlin, Barcelona,
and Paris.”).
57.
Does Sharing Mean Caring?, supra note 9, at 419.
58.
Tim Logan, Emily Alpert Reyes & Ben Poston, Airbnb and Other Short-Term Rentals Worsen Housing
Shortage, Critics Say, L.A. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/business/realestate/la-fi-airbnbhousing-market-20150311-story.html.
59.
Ashifa Kassam, Naked Italians Spark Protests Against Antics of Drunken Tourists in Barcelona, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/21/naked-italians-protests-drunkentourists-barcelona.
60.
Dana Sauchelli & Bruce Golding, Hookers Turning Airbnb Apartments Into Brothels, N.Y. POST (Apr.
14, 2014), http://nypost.com/2014/04/14/hookers-using-airbnb-to-use-apartments-for-sex-sessions/.
61.
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 35.
48.
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that prohibited renting out an apartment for periods of less than 30 days.62 One
New York State Senator complained that Airbnb was recruiting hosts without
regard for their risk of eviction,63 noting that online businesses have become highly
profitable by ignoring state and local laws and ignoring the damage their business
models cause to communities.64 Airbnb frequently states that 87% of its hosts rent
out the residence in which they live via the Airbnb website.65 However, statistics
show that, at least in New York, the remaining 13% of hosts have more than one
listing on Airbnb and make up more than 40% of the listings city-wide.66
Additionally, the bulk of the listings (60%) in New York were for an entire home or
apartment, not the “shared room” idea that Airbnb espouses.67 A report released by
the New York Attorney General’s office in October 2014 concluded that over half of
Airbnb listings were breaking the short-term rental law for multiple-dwelling
buildings.68 Additionally, the report found that a small minority of hosts with
multiple listings made up at least a third of Airbnb’s revenue.69 Finally, listings in
Manhattan and Brooklyn made up 97% of the company’s New York revenue.70
Surveys of listings in other major cities find that this pattern of professionalized
Airbnb home renting carries over throughout the world.71
Organizations like Uber or Airbnb do not represent a true peer-to-peer
economy. On the spectrum of private activities to commercial enterprise, these
organizations hue closer to commercial enterprises. Uber and Airbnb are thirdparty intermediaries that disrupt the producer-consumer exchange or co-owner
relationship characteristic of many true peer-to-peer (P2P) economies.72 An
“independent contractor” for these organizations does not set the price they are
willing to receive for their work or what services they are willing to receive in

62.
OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., AIRBNB IN THE CITY 3 (2014),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Airbnb%20report.pdf.
63.
Press Release Liz Krueger, Senator, New York State Senator, On Behalf of Regular New Yorkers, Sen.
Krueger Responds to Airbnb’s “Three Principles” (Oct. 13, 2013), http://www.nysenate.gov/pressrelease/behalf-regular-new-yorkers-sen-krueger-responds-airbnbs-three-principles.
64.
Id.
65.
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 36–37.
66.
Id. at 37.
67.
Id.
68.
OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN. OF THE STATE OF N.Y., AIRBNB IN THE CITY 2 (2014),
http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Airbnb%20report.pdf.
69.
Id. (6% of hosts with more than two listings made up 36% of Airbnb’s revenue); see also WHAT’S
YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 38.
70.
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 38.
71.
Id. at 39 (“Finally, despite the emphasis on regular people sharing the homes in which they live, hosts
with multiple listings do make up a substantial part of the company’s business. The makeup differs from city to
city.”). Id. (“In Paris, the company’s biggest city, entire homes make up nearly 90% of Airbnb’s business, and in
major centers such as Berlin, Amsterdam, and Lisbon they make up over 70%.”).
72.
Infra Part I.
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exchange for their work.73 Additionally, organizations like Uber and Airbnb usually
take a percentage of the money a service provider earns.74 An Uber driver’s or
Airbnb host’s options are limited to whether or not they will participate in the
sharing economy as contractors. They do not have the right to make management
decisions or receive equal ownership rights in the company. Without these third
party intermediaries, it is possible that the sharing economy service providers would
not have offered up their time and possessions. The uncertainty of how to classify
or regulate these individuals, who are not quite employees (professional providers)
nor contractors (private individuals), is a challenge across all third-party
platforms.75
II.

REGULATED INDUSTRIES AND THE SHARING ECONOMY: WHEN IS A
76
RAVEN LIKE A WRITING DESK?

The majority of the regulations that effect third-party platforms like Uber and
Airbnb are municipal regulations, the same regulations that generally dictate which
permits, licenses, etc. the hotel and taxi industries need to operate.77 Enforcement
of these local regulations is generally carried out on a complaint-driven basis.78
Generally, regulators prefer to avoid stepping in to enforce those regulations in the
hopes that parties will be able to resolve the problem themselves.79 Thus, there is a
certain amount of leeway built into regulations; this gray area of enforcement
combined with “blurred boundaries between non-commercial and commercial
activities” characteristic of the sharing economy is what third-party platforms like
Uber and Airbnb exploit to avoid formalized industry regulations.80 In order for
regulators to effectively manage the scaling-up of traditionally private activities by
the sharing economy they must also be able to draw boundaries within this gray
73.

Infra Part II.C.
Jeffrey Pfeffer, How to Make a Fortune Without “Doing” Anything: The Uber, Airbnb Story, FORTUNE
(Nov. 24, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/11/24/uber-airbnb-sharing-economy-fallacy/.
75.
Supra Part IV.
76.
LEWIS CARROLL, ALICE’S ADVENTURES IN WONDERLAND 97–98, 100–101 (A BookVirtual Digital
Edition, v.1.2 2000)
The Hatter opened his eyes very wide on hearing this; but all he said was ‘Why is a raven like a
writing-desk?’ … ‘I believe I can guess that,’ [Alice] added aloud. ‘Do you mean that you think you
can find out the answer to it?’ said the March Hare. ‘Exactly so,’ said Alice. ‘Then you should say
what you mean,’ the March Hare went on. ‘I do,’ Alice hastily replied; ‘at least—at least I mean what
I say—that’s the same thing, you know.’ ‘Not the same thing a bit!’ said the Hatter. ‘Why, you
might just as well say that ‘I see what I eat’ is the same thing as ‘I eat what I see’!’ …. ‘Have you
guessed the riddle yet?’ the Hatter said, turning to Alice again. ‘No, I give it up,’ Alice replied:
‘what’s the answer?’ ‘I haven’t the slightest idea,’ said the Hatter.
77.
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 40.
78.
Id.
79.
Id.
80.
Id.
74.

134

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Murphy Page Proof v2 (Do Not Delete)

12/5/2016 7:38 PM

Meaghan Murphy
area of the commercial spectrum. The current legal framework to regulate
industries like the hotel or taxi business is not well-suited for regulating the
amorphous commercial exchanges of the sharing economy.
Most of these regulations were designed with a competitive, not collaborative,
economy in mind.81 In regulated industries, such as housing, the relationship
between participating individuals is polarized.82 Additionally, the purpose of these
regulated industries is usually to make a profit. Scholars typically attribute three
primary motivations to participation in a competitive economy: personal,
commercial, or charitable.83 The various motivations dictate the level, type, or lack
of regulation assigned to it.84 The scale of the involvement also plays a part in the
type of regulation.85 The motivations of the individuals and organizations in the
sharing economy can be less clear-cut.86 Frequently, sharing economy participants
may be involved in activities that straddle the line between any two of those three
motivations.87 Finally, a transaction in the sharing economy may not involve
money, whereas money is one side of the presumed exchange in a competitive
economy.88 A transaction in the sharing economy may involve work for food, or
good for good, with no money changing hands.89
The legal gray area that transactions in the sharing economy exist in make it
difficult to regulate under current laws. Moreover, the ever-evolving nature of the
sharing economy makes it difficult to create new laws that will be responsive to
future developments and changes. Thus regulators are forced to ask the question:
are transactions in the sharing economy private actions that should not be regulated
or are they commercial activities that merit the same type of regulation as the
professional industries on which they infringe?
A.

Industry Regulations Protect Consumers and the Market

This conundrum requires regulators to consider the purposes and types of
regulation available. A regulation “refers to the use of legal instruments to

81.

PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 15, at 13.
Id. (providing as an example the relationship between a landlord-tenant where there is a clear division
of duties and rights apportioned to each with little to no overlap, which is less clear in a collaborative economy).
83.
Id. at 14.
84.
Id.
85.
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 40 (“For those of us living on streets with driveways: most of
us have no problem with occasional yard sales; if a neighbor starts to run a yard sale every weekend we might
get irritated with the cars parked in the street; if half a dozen people on the street are constantly having yard
sales, then it starts to disrupt the community and maybe the city should enforce its zoning laws.”).
86.
PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 15, at 15.
87.
Id.
88.
Id.
89.
Id. at 16.
82.
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implement social and economic policy objectives.”90 There are multitudes of
regulations and the purposes of each are varied. Regulations may be designed to
protect consumers or marketplaces, regulate a profession, protect communities and
ecosystems, protect a resource or public necessity, protect workers or contractors in
a particular industry, or ensure equitable access to public accommodations.91
Generally, regulations are a necessary corrective measure to address market failure
in the form of “inefficient or inequitable outcomes.”92 P2P transactions in the
sharing economy are particularly susceptible to market failure absent some form of
regulation, be that via government or self-regulation.93 There are various theories to
explain the existence and form of different regulations. One such example is the
“public interest theory,” which suggests that regulations emerge from public
demand in response to a market failure.94 The “capture theory” of regulation
suggests that regulations serve the interests of the regulated industries.95 Regulations
can ensure the public welfare,96 but applying those regulations to the emerging
sharing economy presents unique challenges.
Taxi regulations are largely determined by the city the drivers work in, but
usually they involve registration, vehicle inspections and maintenance, caps on
prices, universal accessibility, extensive background checks, and minimum
insurance requirements.97 Two common regulations require taxi firms to offer
universal access: covering the entire city and ability to transport anybody without
discrimination.98 Some taxi regulations require drivers to have knowledge of the
geography and landmarks of the city.99 However, regulations are not limited to the
quality and service of the individual taxi. Often the supply of taxis is regulated,
usually in the form of a “taxi medallion,” to better manage traffic congestion by
considering the number of private drivers on the road and the availability of other
means of public transportation.100

90.

Self-Regulation and Innovation, supra note 9, at 119.
PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 15, at 417–19.
92.
Self-Regulation and Innovation, supra note 9, at 120.
93.
Id.
94.
Id. at 120 n.9.
95.
Id.
96.
PRACTICING LAW IN THE SHARING ECONOMY, supra note 15, at 417–19.
97.
Sam Frizzel, A Historical Argument Against Uber: Regulations are There for a Reason, TIME (Nov. 19,
2014), http://time.com/3592035/uber-taxi-history/; see also WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 59–60.
98.
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 68.
99.
Id. at 60 (“In a few cities, being a taxi driver is a skilled occupation, the most famous being London
with its examination ‘The Knowledge.’ Applicants must memorize all 25,000 streets in the city, along with any
businesses or landmarks on them, before they can become a driver, a task that takes several years and which is
often compared to qualifying for to practice law or medicine.”).
100.
Id. at 60–62.
91.
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Hotel regulations vary by municipality, but generally hotels and bed-andbreakfasts must register with their city, apply for permits and licenses, pass periodic
health and safety inspections, and pay tourist taxes.101 By avoiding these expenses,
Airbnb hosts have a financial advantage with none of the responsibilities or
consumer safeguards guaranteed by city regulations.102
The scale of the sharing economy creates the same problems that regulations
were intended to fix in the hotel and taxi industry. New digital platforms that
facilitate peer-to-peer transactions in the sharing economy are innovative and
respond to a need in the marketplace.103 Some research suggests that economic
activity on these digital platform benefit lower income consumers more than
others.104 Regulations provide uniformity in the quality of services and ensure the
provider is well-qualified for the services offered.105 They ensure that even if a
consumer suffers from information asymmetries106 about her driver, such as driving
skills, she knows that he had to meet specific certifications in order to receive

101.
See BALT. CITY, MD., CODE Article 13, Subtitle §§ 5–6, https://law.resource.org/
pub/us/code/md/baltimore.code.article.13.pdf
A license may be issued or renewed under this subtitle only if: (1) all dwelling units are currently
registered under Subtitle 4 {‘Non-Owner-Occupied Dwellings; Vacant Structures’} of this article;
(2) the registration fees and all outstanding interest and late fees required by Subtitle 4 have been
paid; (3) the premises have been inspected by the Commissioner; (4) the premises are in
compliance with State laws and regulations governing lead paint; and (5) the premises are not
subject to an unabated violation notice issued under § 116 {‘Unsafe Structures’} of the Baltimore
City Building Code.
N.Y. MULT. DWELL. LAW § 2 (McKinney 1946), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/buildings/pdf/
MultipleDwellingLaw.pdf
It is hereby declared that intensive occupation of multiple dwelling sites, overcrowding of multiple
dwelling rooms, inadequate provision for light and air, and insufficient protection against the
defective provision for escape from fire, and improper sanitation of multiple dwellings in certain
areas of the state are a menace to the health, safety, morals, welfare, and reasonable comfort of the
citizens of the state; and that the establishment and maintenance of proper housing standards
requiring sufficient light, air, sanitation and protection from fire hazards are essential to the public
welfare. Therefore the provisions hereinafter prescribed are enacted and their necessity in the public
interest is hereby declared as a matter of legislative determination.
See also WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 42.
102.
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 42; Permit Locator, S. F. BUS. PORTAL,
http://businessportal.sfgov.org/permits-licenses (last visited Oct. 25, 2016)(listing permits and licenses—
common to most large cities—required to run a bed-and-breakfast or hotel in San Francisco, such as: a
certificate of authority to collect transient occupancy tax, hotel & emergency shelter program permit, food
facility registration, seller’s permit, manager’s food handling certification, weights & measures automated point
of sale registration, sign permit, food handler’s card, building permit, weighing & measuring device permit).
103.
Does Sharing Mean Caring?, supra note 9, at 417.
104.
Self-Regulation and Innovation, supra note 9, at 129.
105.
Does Sharing Mean Caring?, supra note 9, at 461.
106.
Self-Regulation and Innovation, supra note 9, at 120.
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permission to give rides to passengers.107 The late night bar patron who calls a taxi
knows that prices will be the same regardless of the time of night due to taxi
regulations. If a patron books a room at a hotel, she knows that the hotel has to
meet specific quality and safety tests to keep its doors open.
The providers or “independent contractors” on sharing economy platforms do
not face the same types of regulations. There are risks involved in transactions on
the part of both the consumers and the providers that would benefit from
regulation.108 Sharing economy providers may practice fraudulent behavior, unsafe
behavior, or carry inadequate insurance to compensate consumers for injuries they
receive.109 However, regulation of these innovative new platforms has the potential
to quash the benefits they provide to society. Regulations may slow the “growth of
employment” and the investment in new technology by these digital platforms.110
Additionally, regulations passed in reaction to sharing economy platforms currently
in existence may inhibit the creation of future sharing economy practices or not
appropriately regulate those future practices.111
B. Regulations for the Sharing Economy Have Been Negotiated and Lobbied in Most
Cities.
Regulation of industries such as hospitality and taxis vary by municipality; thus
there is no standard set of regulations that apply to all third-party platforms.
Inconsistency between municipal regulations have resulted in varied approaches to
regulating Uber and Airbnb. However, hotel and taxi regulations, regardless of
geography, share some similarities in terms of protecting consumer safety generally
via permits, licenses, and quality checks.
Ride-sharing services like Uber infringe on the same services provided by the
heavily regulated taxi industry, which has been known to spark protests amongst
taxi drivers.112 Some states have taken action by imposing different sets of rules on
“Transportation Network Companies” like Uber.113 These rules allow for freelance

107.
Sam Frizzel, A Historical Argument Against Uber: Regulations are There for a Reason, TIME (Nov. 19,
2014), http://time.com/3592035/uber-taxi-history/.
108.
Does Sharing Mean Caring?, supra note 9, at 469.
109.
Id. at 423.
110.
Self-Regulation and Innovation, supra note 9, at 116.
111.
Does Sharing Mean Caring?, supra note 9, at 421.
112.
Adam Lidgett, Uber In Paris: Minimum Fares Reduction Protested By French Drivers For The Ride
Booking Service, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.ibtimes.com/uber-paris-minimum-faresreduction-protested-french-drivers-ride-booking-service-2139152; see also Melinda Howells, Taxi drivers heckle
Deputy Premier Jackie Trad at protest against Uber, ABC NEWS (Oct. 14, 2015), http://www.abc.net.au/news/
2015-10-14/brisbane-taxi-drivers-protest-against-uber-outside-parliament/6853936.
113.
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 58 (“California became the first state to create a separate set
of rules for what it called Transportation Network Companies (TNCs), Uber and Lyft were the main

138

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Murphy Page Proof v2 (Do Not Delete)

12/5/2016 7:38 PM

Meaghan Murphy
driving via ridesharing apps but require the drivers to explain how they will
accommodate disabled passengers.114 However, these regulations are not firmly
enforced, as Uber claims that the Americans with Disabilities Act does not apply to
it because it is not a public service.115 Other cities have answered the conflict
between taxis and Uber in different ways. Berlin and Brussels banned the Uber ridesharing service completely.116 Later, the Frankfurt District Court banned Uber
nationwide in Germany.117 The court noted the lack of necessary licenses and
insurance, as well as the unfair competition to the taxi industry to justify its
decision.118 In London, Uber faced a suit by the taxi industry who claimed that
Uber’s smartphone application qualified as a “taximeter,” which regulations dictate
may only be used in licensed taxi cabs.119 The taxi industry lost the suit, but Uber
still faced local protests.120 These different approaches highlight the importance of
the community and context in which Uber offers its services when determining
regulation.
Regulation of Airbnb has likewise taken many different forms depending on the
city. In particular, New York has vigilantly fined Airbnb hosts who rent rooms or
homes to strangers in contravention of local housing regulations.121 Other cities, like
Amsterdam, have relaxed regulations to allow Airbnb hosts to rent private homes to
tourists.122 In 2012, after finding that about half of Airbnb’s 4,000 Amsterdam
listings were illegal123 and not paying tourist taxes, Airbnb and Amsterdam reached
an agreement that Airbnb would collect taxes on behalf of their hosts.124 This effort
to reduce regulatory uncertainties by relaxing regulations is a marked contrast to
New York’s approach. In Portland, Oregon, Airbnb and the city partnered on a
“Shared City” initiative, which legitimized Airbnb and required its hosts to pass

beneficiaries. The TNC framework has since been adopted by Colorado, as well as Seattle, Minneapolis, Austin,
Houston, and Washington.”).
114.
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 68.
115.
Id. at 69.
116.
Does Sharing Mean Caring?, supra note 9, at 418.
117.
Id.
118.
Id.
119.
Id. at 418–19.
120.
Id. at 419.
121.
Does Sharing Mean Caring?, supra note 9, at 419.
122.
Id. at 420.
123.
Loek Essers, Amsterdam Using Airbnb Listing Service to Identify Illegal Rentals, IT WORLD (Feb. 4,
2013),
http://www.itworld.com/article/2716001/it-management/amsterdam-using-airbnb-listing-service-toidentify-illegal-rentals.html. Amsterdam city regulations required residents who rented out their homes to
register with the city, keep business records, limit the number of guests to a maximum of four people, and rent
no more than 40% of the floor area of the house. Id.
124.
Robin van Daalen, Airbnb to Collect Tourist Taxes in Amsterdam, WALL STREET JOURNAL (Dec. 18,
2014), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/12/18/airbnb-to-collect-tourist-taxes-in-amsterdam/.
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safety inspections, notify neighbors, and buy a permit.125 Meanwhile, Airbnb would
pay taxes on behalf of its hosts.126 Unfortunately, this effort has not yet proven to be
successful as only 166 of 1600 hosts applied for the permit by its deadline.127 It is
clear that there is not one clear approach to regulating sharing economy practices
effectively.

III. THERE IS NO SCHOLARLY CONSENSUS ON THE BEST LEVEL OF
GOVERNMENT TO REGULATE THE SHARING ECONOMY.

Many sharing economy activists advocate that individuals who participate as equal
stakeholders in local sharing economies enjoy the benefits of sharing their services
and goods within the community. However, international organizations, such as
Uber or Airbnb, should not be regulated in the same way as these truly local
enterprises. Scholars differ as to the best method, proposing everything from a
global regulatory platform to municipal regulations. However, in order to
efficiently regulate the sharing economy, local governments are the best option in
order to respond to rapidly advancing technology and innovation. Local
governments are in the best position to distinguish between professional providers
taking advantage of loopholes in industrial regulations and casual participants in
the sharing economy. This places cities in the best position to create appropriate
regulations for their unique circumstances.
The appropriate governance level at which to regulate the sharing economy is a
contentious matter amongst scholars. Some believe that a global regulatory
platform would be the most efficient means of managing the sharing economy.128
Alternatively, advocates for regulation on the national scale believe that Congress
could adapt successful state and municipal sharing economy regulations to protect
and mange emerging markets.129 Others recommend a hands-off approach from the
government that allows third-party platforms of the sharing economy to regulate
themselves.130 Finally, some recommend a synergistic approach of cooperation

125.
Shared City, supra note 1; see also Portland, OR, AIRBNB (May 9, 2016),
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/875/portland—or (last visited Nov. 16, 2016).
126.
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 45–46.
127.
Id. at 46.
128.
Felix Salmon, Why tomorrow’s technology needs a regulatory revolution, FUSION (Feb. 4, 2015),
http://fusion.net/story/43558/why-tomorrows-technology-needs-a-regulatory-revolution/.
129.
Josh Krauss, The Sharing Economy: How State and Local Governments Are Failing and Why We Need to
Get Congress Involved, 44 SW. L. REV. 365, 373 (2014).
130.
Nicole Gelinas, Want Less Corruption? Free the Markets, N.Y. POST (Nov. 8, 2015),
http://nypost.com/2015/11/08/want-less-corruption-free-the-markets/.
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between government—whatever the level—and the third party platforms
themselves.131
The global regulatory platform is frequently lauded as the most efficient means
of managing corporations, since compliance with one nation’s regulations would
allow a corporation to automatically be in compliance with all others.132 By
streamlining regulations, Felix Salmon—one of the major proponents of this type
of regulation—believes that a “huge part of any company's regulatory headaches
would disappear,” which would increase their incentive to comply with
regulations.133 However, the critics of a global regulatory platform are just as vocal.
One such critic called this approach “a pipe dream. A fairly worthy pipe dream, but
a pipe dream.”134 These critics recognize that politics moves more like the tortoise
than the quick hare of innovation, and are similarly resistant to change.135 The
global regulatory platform will also prove to be unwieldy since the vast differences
between the various nations, and the variety of regional differences within those
nations, will make it difficult to come to a consensus about necessary and
appropriate global regulations.136 Finally, in a market where these third party
platforms already abdicate responsibility for the actions of their local independent
contractors, while continuing to operate illegally through those same contractors, it
is unlikely that a global regulatory platform would deter them.137
As far as national regulatory platforms, the Federal Trade Commission and antitrust law are two of the most common that spring to mind regarding how the
sharing economy could be regulated. When corporations are permitted to set their
own review processes and oversight, even regarding otherwise legal and beneficial
activities,138 profit margins may frequently take more precedence than consumer
security.139 In situations where the corporation does not have sufficient financial
incentive to change its behavior, the federal government must occasionally step in
131.

Self-Regulation and Innovation, supra note 9, at 116–117.
Christine Lagorio-Chafkin, The Regulatory Revolution for the Sharing Economy That Just Won’t
Happen, INC. (Feb. 9, 2015), http://www.inc.com/christine-lagorio/global-regulatory-revolutioncounterargument.html.
133.
Id. (“[Uber and Airbnb], I’m sure, would be ecstatic to be able to work within a single global
regulatory regime. They could agree to do things like collect local taxes, comply with privacy regulations, and
have clearly-defined avenues for redress when things go wrong.”).
.
134
Id.
135.
Id.
136.
Id. (“It’s not numbers alone that make a flexible global regulatory platform impossible. It’s the scope
of regulations Salmon is proposing that makes the concept itself border on absurd. There’s no replacement for
local regulatory measures (say, you could at one time Uber a motorcycle on Paris’s tiny, urban corridors, but
not on Milwaukee’s massive highways) by global fiat.”).
137.
The Regulatory Revolution That Just Won’t Happen, supra note 133.
138.
Caroline Sweet, The Hidden Scam: Why Consumers Should No Longer Be Forced to Shoulder the Burden
of Liability for Mobile Cramming, 11 J. BUS. TECH. L. 69, 70–71 (2016).
139.
Id. at 79.
132.
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and pass regulations to modulate the corporation’s behavior.140 Proponents of this
level of regulation believe that a national regulatory platform could set minimum
standards for states, similar to the creation of California’s Transportation Network
Companies, in order to create a stop-gap for more specific and locally tailored
regulations to fill.141 Proponents believe this would provide the appropriate balance
between protecting emerging technology and consumer safety.142 This has the
advantage of providing consistency across the nation, mitigating the bureaucratic
actions and red tape required to enter a new market. However, unlike finance and
securities, the industries and services in the sharing economy are typically of a local
character that is unsuited for federal management.
At the far end of the spectrum are scholars who believe that sharing economy
companies and the innovations they introduce to the market should be largely or
completely unfettered by regulation.143 Advocates of this regulatory approach
believe that regulators are more likely to stifle innovation and technological
advancement than protect those they purport to represent.144 Generally, proponents
of this approach believe that in order to remain competitive in the market, these
corporations will have the incentive to moderate their own behavior and ensure
that consumers remain satisfied with their services.145 However, similar to the
critical points mentioned in the other regulatory approaches above, corporations,
which are generally profit-motivated, are unlikely to serve as the best overseers of
their own actions. Regulation to some degree is clearly necessary, and the best
approach may be found in city hall.
IV. SOLVING THE REGULATION PROBLEM: A SLIDING SCALE AND
SUBSIDIARITY- ALLOWING LOCAL GOVERNMENTS TO SET THE
REGULATIONS

Due to the complexity and ever-evolving nature of the sharing economy, proper
regulation requires a level of nuance that is unsuitable for the national level. While
companies in all sectors of the economy face certain types of overlapping regulation
140.

Id. at 82.
Krauss, supra note 130, at 373.
142.
Id.
143.
Nicole Gelinas, Want Less Corruption? Free the Markets, N.Y. POST (Nov. 8, 2015),
http://nypost.com/2015/11/08/want-less-corruption-free-the-markets/.
144.
Simon Rothman, The Rise of the Uncollared Worker and the Future of the Middle Class, FORBES (Dec. 2,
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/valleyvoices/2014/12/02/the-rise-of-the-uncollared-worker-and-the-futureof-the-middle-class/#1ef0eef6397e.
145.
Self-Regulation and Innovation, supra note 9, at 116–117. (“We argue that the resolution of these
challenges must include self-regulatory approaches. Self-regulation is not the same as deregulation or no
regulation. Rather, it is the reallocation of regulatory responsibility to parties other than the government. We
explain why platforms should not be viewed as entities to be regulated but rather as actors that are a key part of
the regulatory framework in this arena.”).
141.
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on the local, state, federal, and international level, the preemption of state or
municipal regulations on the sharing economy by a national or international
regulations creates the risk of inconsistent or unfair outcomes. No broadly drawn
regulation could possibly be suitable or effective in every municipality. Applying
subsidiarity principles to regulation of the sharing economy allows municipalities to
address these gaps. Additionally, local regulators are in the best position to
distinguish between professional providers and casual participants in the sharing
economy. Local regulators will be able to target the professional providers who
should be subject to the more stringent regulations and the casual participants
subject to regulations similar to a private citizen. The practice of distinguishing
between regulations for large firms versus small or independent providers is very
common.146 Therefore, it is appropriate for a regulatory body to set different
regulations depending on the characteristics of the business.147
A. The Time and Money Earned by Participating in the Sharing Economy Should
Dictate the Level of Regulation.
Despite the claims to the contrary, the version of the sharing economy espoused by
third-party platforms like Uber and Airbnb is less altruistic and about neighbors
sharing amongst themselves than it is about a small number of organizations
making massive profits. Like many corporations, the goal is less about community
development and more about increasing profit margins. Hence, many third-party
platforms’ “independent contractor” or middleman approach to their work force in
lieu of cultivating full-time, knowledgeable employees in the community.148 Many
third-party platforms claim that their contractors are only participating to make
some extra money. This has come to the forefront of the new sharing economy in
recent court cases.149 However, this language is very similar to the language of
employers when women entered the work force, it is not a real job—even if it is

146.
See generally Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 45 C.F.R. § 155.20 (2016)(distinguishing
between the types of rules that apply to different types of employers and insurance plans); accord WILLIAM D.
MITCHELL, EMPLOYER HEALTH CARE PLANS AFTER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT §§ 7.3-7.9 (2016); see also Danielle
Keats Citron & Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1,
20 n.113 (2014)(suggesting setting a threshold for regulation of data-mining that permits smaller businesses’
consumer research to be unregulated).
147.
Supra note 146.
148.
See generally Uber Technologies Inc. v. Berwick, No. CGC-15-546378, notice of appeal filed (Cal. Super.
Ct., S.F. Cnty. Jun. 16, 2015).
149.
Mike Isaac & Natasha Singer, California Says Uber Driver Is Employee, Not a Contractor, N.Y. TIMES
(Jun. 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/18/business/uber-contests-california-labor-ruling-that-saysdrivers-should-be-employees.html.
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your primary source of income—so drivers do not need the protections given to
employees.150
In order to effectively manage the balance between allowing part-time casual
workers who want to make some extra money and those using sharing economy
sources in ways similar to the more heavily regulated industries like hotels and taxis,
a sliding scale of “independent contractor” participation should be implemented.
This should prevent the type of abuses seen in many cities by landlords emptying
rent-controlled apartments for more lucrative short-term Airbnb rentals151 or the
taxi industries fear of being supplanted by full-time Uber drivers.152 This sliding
scale should also force third-party platforms to be more aware of those abusing the
system in order to avoid regulations. If an individual participates above a certain
amount of hours, at that point they should be considered an employee of the thirdparty platform. This would force those organizations to keep a better internal
management system to comply with local regulations. By considering those
individuals “employees” of the platform, it would make the company liable for the
individual’s actions in the case of regulatory violations while protecting the
independent contractors from being abused by the platform system.153 Additionally,
it would draw a clearer line between private sharing facilitated by the third-party
platforms and those using the platforms professionally to circumvent regulations.
This type of distinction was acknowledged in San Francisco’s Proposition F.154 It
proposed different, more stringent regulations for those who rent above 75 nights a
year for a single unit.155 This recognizes the difference between the true sharing
economy participants working as private individuals and those working as platform

150.
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 10–11, (“The language of ‘a little extra money’ turns out to
be the same as that used about women’s jobs forty years ago, when they were not seen as ‘real’ jobs that
demanded a living wage, and so did not need to be treated the same, or paid as much, as men’s jobs.”).
151.
Bianca Barragan, Rent-Controlled Tenants Were Evicted, Then Found Their Apartments on Airbnb,
CURBED (Dec. 17, 2015), http://la.curbed.com/archives/2015/12/ellis_act_evictions_airbnb_lawsuit.php; see also
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 39.
152.
Oliver Moore, Frustration Escalates as Toronto Taxi Drivers Stage Mass Uber Protests, THE GLOBE AND
MAIL (Dec. 9, 2015), http://www.theglobeandmail.com/news/toronto/taxi-drivers-clog-toronto-streets-inmass-uber-protest/article27658787/.
153.
The Scored Society, supra note 147, at 19 (“One of the great accomplishments of the legal order was
holding the sovereign accountable for decision making and giving subjects basic rights, in breakthroughs
stretching from Runnymede to the Glorious Revolution of 1688 to the American Revolution. New algorithmic
decision makers are sovereign over important aspects of individual lives. If law and due process are absent from
this field, we are essentially paving the way to a new feudal order of unaccountable reputational
intermediaries.”).
154.
Ordinance Regulating Illegal Use of Housing for Tourist Accommodations, CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN
FRANCISCO CODE § 41A.4 & 41A. 5 (proposed May 6, 2015)(defeated Nov. 2, 2015), 12,
http://sfgov2.org/ftp/uploadedfiles/elections/candidates/Nov2015/ShortTermRentals_Text.pdf.
155.
Id.
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employees. The sliding scale of employment theory is not new.156 Currently, there is
a binary in the marketplace between employee and independent contractor with
nothing in between.157 An ideal marketplace would include a continuum with
possibilities in the middle, but that is not how the market currently works.158
Acknowledging the realities of the current market, regulators can take advantage of
the current bipolar system of employment to encourage accountability. By
classifying individuals on third party platforms as employees when they pass a
certain threshold of time worked or money earned, regulators can force cost-averse
companies to be more vigilant in monitoring their contractors. By preventing abuse
of their systems, third party platforms will ensure that individuals cannot
circumvent local hotel or taxi regulations and thereby subject the company to
regulatory liability. The independent contractors on these third party platforms are
currently in a kind of limbo regarding their work. Depending on their level of
engagement with the platform, particularly if it serves as their primary source of
income, they are not true independent contractors. It is this extreme level of
participation that creates problems which necessitate regulation and removes the
activity from the private realm.159
This is a similar predicament to those individuals who participate in crowdsourcing. Crowd-sourcing is a relatively new phenomenon wherein businesses
create minor, discrete tasks and then publish them in an online forum for the
general public to complete, generally in exchange for a small amount of monetary
compensation.160 Occasionally, no money is offered, but individuals will contribute
regardless.161 Businesses engage in this practice for many reasons, from gathering
data to avoiding hiring an employee to complete the same task. Individuals engage

156.
Joseph Armenti, Click-Work or Click-Play: Crowdsourcing and the Work-Leisure Distinction (Jan 1,
2014), http://erepository.law.shu.edu/student_scholarship/137; see also Andre Hagiu and Rob Biederman,
Companies Need an Option Between Contractor and Employee, HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (Aug. 21, 2015),
https://hbr.org/2015/08/companies-need-an-option-between-contractor-and-employee.
157.
Andre Hagiu and Rob Biederman, Companies Need an Option Between Contractor and Employee,
HARVARD BUSINESS REVIEW (Aug. 21, 2015), https://hbr.org/2015/08/companies-need-an-option-betweencontractor-and-employee.
158.
Id.
159.
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 40 (“Complaint-based enforcement goes together with
blurred boundaries between non-commercial and commercial activities to provide a space for a ‘gray area’ of
informal commerce that is part of daily life in most cities. The goal of Airbnb, as of many Sharing Economy
companies, is to take this gray area and scale it up. But scale changes things, informal dispute resolution
becomes impossible, and activities that were previously benign become problematic.”).
160.
Click-Work or Click-Play, supra note 157, at 2.
161.
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 15 (“Wikipedia shows that software platforms can collect
together the efforts of millions of collaborators to make something that is new and global and different, and it
inspired the building of web sites such as Airbnb’s.”).
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in either skilled or un-skilled tasks in exchange for pay, of which the platform will
generally keep a percentage.162
Thus, the structure of a third-party platforms’ independent contractor system is
similar to the crowd-sourcing phenomenon. Tests proposed for determining
whether click-workers are entitled to employee benefits may be similarly applicable
in determining the level of regulation for which the individual working for the third
party platform is subject. One test proposed to regulate click-workers, which would
be similarly applicable to independent contractors on third party platforms,
requires regulators to place themselves in the shoes of the workers.163 This test
proposes that in addition to income, the amount of time invested in the activity
should be considered in determining whether the work is being “meaningfully used
to support one’s livelihood.”164 The consideration of time and income should allow
those casually using these platforms to earn extra income without being subject to
the same stringent regulations as professionals in the same industry.165 Local
regulators are in the best position to judge an individual’s veracity than state or
national regulators, much like how an appellate court does not challenge the trial
judge’s opinion of a witness’ veracity.
B. Subsidiarity: Why Local Government Is Best Suited to Regulate the Sharing
Economy.
As discussed in Part III, there are many opinions about which level of government
is best suited to regulate the sharing economy. This Comment suggests that local
government is the best vehicle for sharing economy regulation by applying
principles of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity is a theory of governance which suggests that
“action should be taken at the lowest level of government at which particular
objectives can adequately be achieved.”166 This is not a novel suggestion.
Many nations have a vertical governance structure that grants different levels of
government specific powers and responsibilities. For example, in the United States
we adhere to principles of federalism. Federalism permits the states a large degree of
autonomy to manage their own affairs. One of the purposes of this policy is so that

162.

Click-Work or Click-Play, supra note 157, at 20.
Id. at 33.
164.
Id. at 34.
165.
Id. at 33 (“[I]t is less important to protect the penny-earners unless the clicker’s financial situation
dictates otherwise. The court should not craft its dragnet to capture negligible amounts.”).
166.
George Bermann, Taking Subsidiarity Seriously: Federalism in the European Community and the United
States, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 331, 338 (1994) (“The notion that action should be taken at the lowest level of
government at which particular objectives can adequately be achieved can be applied in any polity in which
governmental authority is lodged at different vertical levels.”).
163.
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states may serve as proving grounds for effective policies of national problems.167
The inverse of this concept is subsidiarity. Instead of testing policy plans or
regulations on the local or state level to later implement at the national level,
subsidiarity suggests that if they are successfully regulated at those lower levels then
there is no need for a higher level of government to preempt those regulations.168 It
is important to note that many of the pertinent regulations implicated by the
sharing economy are already resolved at the state and municipal level.169 Therefore,
there are many advantages to allowing this model to stand and avoiding
preemption by national or international regulatory frameworks.
Much like regulation of traffic and housing ordinances, local governments
generally have the best grasp on the unique problems and pitfalls of regulation in
their communities. Local governments are typically more responsive and act more
quickly than state and federal government since there is a congruence in interests
that does not require as much compromise as larger regions. Additionally, local
governments are already the means by which many shared goods are provided, such
as sports fields, libraries, and pools, to name a few.170 Finally, local regulation would
encourage innovation by allowing cities to experiment with different regulations in
order to arrive at the most efficient means of managing the sharing economy. This
experience combined with an understanding of the community character makes
local government the ideal vehicle to regulate the sharing economy.
Third-party platforms like Uber and Airbnb have recognized the power that
local governments hold over the success of their business. In Texas, Uber launched
attack ads against a councilmember who proposed enhancing the background
checks on Uber drivers.171 This is not a new tactic for Uber.172 Airbnb has also gotten
into the political fray by launching an ad campaign in San Francisco in response to
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New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the
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laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”).
168.
Aurelian Portuese, The Principle of Subsidiarity as a Principle of Economic Efficiency, 17 COLUM. J. EUR.
L. 231, 232 (2011).
169.
Orly Lobel, The Law of the Platform, LEGAL STUD. RES. PAPER SERIES, Res. Paper 16-212, 51 (Mar.
2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Papers.cfm?abstract_id=2742380## (“A promising aspect of the
contemporary law of the platform is that many of the regulatory questions of Web 3.0, including zoning,
consumer protection, residential and transportation safety, worker rights, and occupational licensing, are
traditionally resolved at the state and local levels. This decentralization lends to a productive natural
experiment. Local governments can learn to see the benefits of collaborating and participating in the platform
economy and to try different paths toward the policy goals with which they are charged.”).
170.
WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 23.
171.
Audrey McGlinchy & Andrew Weber, Uber Launches an In-App Campaign Against Austin City Council
Member, KUT.ORG (Nov. 5, 2015), http://kut.org/post/uber-launches-app-online-campaign-against-austincity-council-member.
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Id.; see also WHAT’S YOURS IS MINE, supra note 11, at 19.
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proposed restrictions on how often an Airbnb host may rent their home.173 San
Francisco’s Proposition F would cap private short-term rentals, such as those
offered by Airbnb hosts, at 75 nights per unit.174 Additionally, there would be
regulatory oversight to ensure compliance with housing codes, payment of hotel
taxes, filing of quarterly reports with the city, and increase the ability of those
affected by the rentals to have standing to bring lawsuits.175
Though third-party platform providers are international corporate juggernauts,
their work force of “independent contractors” live and operate in their local
communities. For example, it would be unusual to think of riding an Uber for a
significant distance, as it is typically used for short to medium distance rides in
urban centers. Uber is not available everywhere in a state, but usually only in cities
and surrounding areas.176 Municipal and state government is already the primary
means of enforcing regulations regarding community resources and localized
industries, such as the hotel and taxi industry, and it is well situated to create and
enforce regulations of individuals participating in the sharing economy. After all,
“[e]ach city’s needs are different, because the stresses and challenges facing each city
is different.”177 As sociologist Juliet Schor points out, there is a mental disconnect
between treating the sharing economy and traditionally regulated industries or local
public commons as substantially different178 merely because the internet is
involved.179 Thus, local regulation is the best approach for managing such a broad
and unwieldy field as the sharing economy and should not be preempted by
national or international regulatory platforms.
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Id. at 19 (“There is great diversity among activities as well as baffling boundaries drawn by
participants… Airbnb is practically synonymous with the Sharing Economy, but traditional bed and breakfasts
are left out… Shouldn’t public libraries and parks count?”).
179.
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http://www.wweek.com/portland/blog-32614video_city_commissioner_nick_fish_berates_airbnb_lobbyist.html (“This has shades of Uber all over it. We
invoke the Internet, and we claim an exemption from all the other laws and rules of society, because we’re
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places—we have to make sure that guest is safe.”).
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CONCLUSION

Third party platforms in the sharing economy, though they may utilize typically
private activities, should not be regulated in the same manner as private citizens.180
To efficiently regulate these businesses, local governments are best-situated to
respond to rapidly advancing technology and innovation.181 Furthermore, they
already control many regulatory issues affected by the rise of the sharing
economy.182 Principles of subsidiarity suggest that regulation should therefore
remain at this level and not be preempted by national or international regulations.183
Regulation of the individuals working as “independent contractors” for these
organizations will be a key aspect in effective regulation.184 Local regulations should
allow sufficient flexibility for truly private individuals to participate via the
platforms, without overly stringent regulations, while preventing circumvention by
those who abuse the third-party platforms.185 In order to do this, local regulators
must place themselves in the shoes of the individuals working for the platform and
analyze the time invested and income received by those sharing economy
activities.186 This should also encourage the third-party platforms to be more
diligent in assuring that their “contractors” do not abuse local regulations, or risk
facing the liability of those contractors as employees.187 By applying principles of
subsidiarity and recognizing a spectrum of sharing economy participation from
casual participant to professional provider, local regulators should have flexibility to
encourage the innovations and benefits brought about by the sharing economy
without infringing upon traditionally regulated industries and endangering public
health or safety.
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